This evening we will talk about the third of the philosophers with whom we are dealing in this series of lectures, Bertrand Russell, a young Englishman. A few years ago Russell was a professor of mathematics at Cambridge University, but because of his pacifism he incurred the displeasure of the British government when the European War broke out, and he resigned his professorship until the end of the war. Today we will talk about the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy, leaving consideration of his ethics and political philosophy for our next lect ure.
Because Russell insists that knowledge must be universal, and that it can never be purely personal, he abjures psychology on the ground that its utilization in philosophy would,obviate universality. Russell tells us that the reason mathematics has not earlier been used as a basis for phil osophy is that i twas not until recent yei\rs that mathematics was sufficiently developed to serve, this purpose. But he is sure that now man has developed mathematics to a sufficiently high degree to warrant its employment as the foundation of philosophical method.
There is one point at which ,the philosophy of Russell resembles that of James, although this may not be particularly significant, and this is that both are pluralists. I'm sure that you know that some philosophies are pluralistic, and others monistic. A pluralistic philosopher refuses to try to embrace all real ity under a single principle, while on the other hand the monistic philosopher does. James, with his great emphasis on individuality, takes the individual as the central ppint from which experience is to be considered, and he is thus a pluralistic philosopher. In this particular respect, R~ssell 's basic position is like that of James, and we can also call him a pluralist.
In his writings Russell designates his philosophy "logical atomism" or "absolute pluralism." In espousing a pluralistic view, Russell points out that plural ism does not adlllit, of the con,ce.pt of a' sirlgle,unita'ry universe, a cDncept which was generally accepted prior to the develDpment of modern astronomy. For centuries people had thought of the earth as the centre Df the universe, with the sun, moon, and stars revDlving about it. But the work of Copernicus rendered this concept unt~nable,' and now astrrinomy has developed to the point at which it is no'longer possi~le~o think'in terms of a single universe.
At this point I must make one thing clear: since Russell's philosophy is SD completely fDunded i~mathematics, which is a highly specialized area of inquiry, it would 'b~impDssible for me' to give anything 1ike an adequate introduction to' it, or even a coherent outline of it, within the scope of these two popular lectures. This evening I am not going to talk about the content of Russell's philosophy at all; instead, I have chosen to di scuss with YDU some of Russell's cdticisms of other school s of philosophy, in the hope that this somewhat negative approach will suggest to you the general outlines of his own position.
Russell sees two fundamental mistakes in traditional philosophy: first, it undertook to establish the existence of a unified universe, and 4 to subsume all reality under Dne principle; and second, it has been unduly influenced by religion and ethics, and has undertaken to explain the universe by use of religious and ethical terminologies. Most such philosophies have attributed inherent goodness tD the universe, and have assumed that this goodness is an aspect of reality.
Many religiously oriented philosophers have utilized their religious beliefs as they have dealt with the universe or with reality; they have worked from the assumption that the universe is basically good, and that life is wDrth living. Even those philosophers whD have rejected religion have been, at times without being aware of it, influenced by ethical and moral considerations. For example, even the evolutionists have interpreted the evolution of the universe in terms of moral concepts, presenting evolution as a process of transforming evil into good, into better. Russell rebukes both Spencer and Bergson for their resort to moral concepts in their explanations of evolution, and blames both fDr trying to explain reality in terms of what they consider tD be "the better" .
According to Russell not only has the progress of astronomy undermined the cDncept of a single, unified universe; it has also vitiated all attempts to explain the universe in terms of ethical concepts. In the past, when people thought that the earth was the centre of the universe, and that man was the centre Df the earth, and when they regarded religion and ethics as central to human existence, it was no more than natural for them to conclude that religion and ethics were of equally central importance to the entire universe. What men did was to take the criteria by which they judged their Dwn lives, and extend these to apply to the universe as they cDnceived it. But now mDdern astronDmy has made us aware Df the fact that the earth is no more than a small point in the solar system, and that man is Dnly a trivial Dbject Dn the earth. HDw, then, Russell asks, can man's religion and his ethical systems hold any status in the universe?
After the outbreak Df the EurDpean War, Russell became greatly discDuraged about the prospects for world culture. In one of his articles he develDps the idea of the unimportance of man in reference tD the universe; that in this small portion, the solar system is no more than a small black point, and that in this small point, the earth and the other planets could not be seen except through a microscope, and even under the microscope they would still be infinitesimal. On one of these infinitesimal points, the earth, incredibly tiny beings, composed of gas and water, busily and continually dart hither and yon, trying to extend the brief period of their lives, and killing other similar beings in their efforts to do so. Compared with the sun, man's life is brief indeed. But if they could be observed by beings on other worlds, those beings would hope that men could hasten their own destruction by killing each other.
Russell insists that men must discard their prejudices and biases before they can develop a worthwhile philosophy. For him, philosophy is a matter of pure reason; it is speculative and is not related in any way with behaviour, but is concerned only with a true knowledge of the universe. Among the sciences, only mathematics is sufficiently detached from mundane concerns, sUfficiently close to pure reason, to serve as the foundation for a rational philosophy. Russell says that philosophy cannot start with the results obtained by science, but that it must utilize scientific methodolGgy. The purest and most accurate of the sciences is mathematics; hence the method of mathematics must become the method of philosophy. The objects of psychology and physics and the other sciences are existential, that is, they each exist as an object; but mathematics has nothing to do with existence. Dealing with the most abstract and universal formulae, it transcends existence. This is why the method of mathematics must be the method of philosophy.
Russell sees psychology and physics and the other sciences as being concerned with individual objects, not with universal and abstract common principles. Mathematics, on the other hand, is concerned only with the most universal and the most abstract formulae, with principles which can be applied in all fields of inquiry independently of the restrictions imposed by concrete individual objects. True knowledge can be sought only through application of the most universal and most abstract common principles -principles which apply only' to the existence of truth, without reference to their own existence as principles. Since philosophy is to be applied to the universals, its principles cannot be either verified or disproved by empirical experience. Empirical experience is materialistic; but the'laws of philosophy are universal in character. These principles are eternal, no matter how much or how often the world changes. Thus only the principles of mathematics and logic can be the foundations of phil osophy.
Russell takes this concept to an extreme. He even equates' "love" and "hate". What he really means, of course, is that these two concepts seem to have important differences in our experience of them, but when they are subjected to logical or philosophical examination, they turn out to be relative to, rather than opposed to, each other.
There is one thing about Russell's philosophy which is strange. In its ethical and social aspects it is quite radical, and fairly consistent with democracy; while in its theoretical aspects it smacks of authoritarianism appropriate to an aristocracy. Russell exalts reason and ignores perception; he emphasizes common principles and depreciates the individual object; he assigns to reason a much higher status than he ac-6 cords to experience. His philosophy in this respect resembles rationalism. This is a strange phenomenon; there is no other philosopher whose theoretical considerations reflect the outlook of artistocracy while at the same time his practical considerations are so close to the democratic ideal.
Why do we compare this attitude with that of the aristocracy? It is simply that some people are impatient with the practical affairs of life, and seek to raise themselves above mundane considerations and enter a sphere of pure reflection. Such people feel that they are "artistic", and that they belong to a higher order of being than the run of common man. It is not difficult to see that the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy are characterized by this tendency.
In one of his articles in which he extols the merit of pure mathematics, and deals with the distinction between the practical life of man and his ideal life, Russell avers that the most one can hope for in a practical life is some sort of adjustment between the ideal on the one hand, and what is possible on the other. But in the world of pure reason, no such adjustment is needed; there is nothing to limit development or to stand in the way of continuing increment of creative activity and noble aspiration. This world of pure reason is far above all human desiring; it is immeasurably beyond the. impoverished phenomena of nature; there man can construct a systematic universe for himself and dwell therein in perfect peace. There human freedom can be realized, and the sUfferings of practical existence be known no more.
In Russell's more popular works we see evidence of his pessimism, amounting at times to anguish. He compares human life to a long journey in the dark, during which the traveller is beset on all sides with perils. Fatigued and tortured, man strives forward toward a destination which he knows not, and has small hope of reaching; and should he reach it, he can pause only a short time before having to resume his travels. This sort of pessimism is not infrequent in philosophy, particularly in philosophies formulated by philosophers who insist that the world of common principles must necessarily transcend the world of individual experience.
In an earlier lecture I noted that James takes the individual object as the most important and precious aspect of existence, and we may wonder why so many other philosophers accord priority to common principles. Russell's disposition is just the opposite of James'. Russell sees the universal principle as a haven of safety for man, as the ultimate and noblest goal toward which man may strive. At the same time that he acquiesces in the mystic's concept of time as an unimportant and superficial aspect of the reality, he tells us that man's first step through the door of wisdom is just to learn to find truth in the consideration of time as unimportant and superficial.
I cannot at this time deal with the detail s of Russell's philosophy. I have been talking chiefly about his attitude toward and his criticisms of other philosophies. It has been said that no more than twenty people in the whole world really understand mathematical philosophy -and I readily admit that I am not one of those twenty! There is one point, though, that can be discussed here. The natural sciences are mean~of dealing with individual objects through reference to common principles. By "common principle" in this connection we mean the scientific laws and principles by means of which we gain an understanding and grasp of our environment, even though the laws themselves are abstract and universal. The object toward which scientific endeavour is directed is th~individual' fact. How can science relate the two -interpret the individual fact in accordance with universal principle?
One answer to this problem is offered inmodern idealism (which is to be distinguished from classic idealism). The Irish philosopher, Berkeley, held that true knowledge of the external world is nothing more than perception, and that what perception consists of is no more than sensation. For example, we see the candle as having a white light and a black wick, and when we touch it, we can tell that it is soft and greasy. A combination of these perceptions becomes our sensation, and constitutes our whole knowledge of the candle. Over and above this, there may exist a "reality" of the candle, but this is not to be known to the human intelligence; and even if it is there, it is of no concern to us. Knowledge is the combination of our various sensations; there is no call for us to concern ourselves with the problem of whether reality exists or whether it doesn't.
In one sense it seems that the progress of the natural sciences lends support to this concept. We now say that the reality of material things is actually the motion of the atoms and molecules which constitute them, and that all their characteristics are the results of such motion. But the idealist denies the reality of the material object, arguing that atoms and molecules are constructs of the human mind, and that as effects produced by our intentional and psychological assumptions, they are wholly subjective. In making these remarks, I have no intention of raising the old problem of mind and matter; my purpose is only to locate the point of dispute. Russell also explains the relationship between the scientist's atoms and molecules on the one hand, and the existence of the individual object on the other, telling us that this relationship is subject to mathematical formulation.
Russell recognizes that the object of perception is only the beginning point of our knowledge, but he is not an idealist. His approach to the problem is similar to that of Leibnitz (1646 Leibnitz ( -1716 who devised the concept of the monad. The sensation of each person is a matter of 8 that person's point of view, and each such sensation has its own reality. With each monad having its own point of view, each person has his own private universe.
Russell holds that since the object of perception is dependent upon the point of view of the individual, and since no two persons ever have identical points of view, their perceptions may be quite different, the one from the other. But Russell permits perception to indicate real existence. For example, when we look at the table from the top, we get a perception which differs from the one we get when we look at it from underneath; but still, no two persons ever have exactly the same perception of the table. Russell would say that there is not just one table, but as many tables as there are persons perceiving it. Each person has his own table, so to speak. As with Leibnitz's monad, since each person has his own point of view, each also has his own universe. Mathematics and science function as means of communication. Insofar as your table can be demonstrated to be the same as his, a systematic universe can begin to be organized. In fact, since each person does have his own universe, the only means of communication possible to us come from logic, the sciences, and mathematics.
Bergson wrote an article in which he contends that it is not possible for human intelligence to encompass reality, change, and duration. He insists that intelligence cuts reality into segments, as the motion picture camera takes pictures of objects in movements in separate "frames", each of which is actually a still photograph. When Bergson drew this analogy, Russell had never seen a motion picture; but after reading Bergson's article, he did go to see one, and came away agreein9 with Bergson that the motion picture camera had indeed divided reality into segments.
But we must also note that although Russell agrees that Bergson's description is accurate, what he means by "dividing into segments" is just the opposite of what Bergson means. Bergson insists that reality is continuous and changing, and that the separate segments are unreal; Russell, on the other hand, sees the movement as misleading, and the segments as real. Each individual object has its own existence; each individual has his own world. This is why Russell calls himself an "absolute pluralist". Reality is segmented, not continuous as Bergson contends. It is only through application of abstract laws that man can organize these segments of reality into a continuous universe. The construction of a universe is the function of science; the universe was not originally continuous. This is rugged individualism with a vengeance! In our next and final lecture, we will talk about Russell's ethics and his political philosophy.
Lecture VI. Russel/'s ethics and political philosophy
We mentioned in our last lecture that the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy differ markedly from the practical aspects. This difference is accounted for by the rigid distinctions which Russell draws between reason and experience, between knowledge and activity, and between the common principle and the individual fact. These distinctions are responsible for the sharp divergence between the theoretical aspects of his philosophy and the social aspects.
These distinctions had led Russell to apply sharply different emphases to the theoretical aspects of his philosophy on the one hand, and to the practical and social aspects on the other. When dealing with the theoretical aspect, Russell subjects human knowledge to fact, and argues that man can have only a speculative view of and a spectator's attitude toward fact -something comparable to the mirror which reflects objects as though the reflected objects were real. But when he deals with practical and social matters, Russell's philosophy is of quite another sort; he depreciates the existent individual fact, and emphasizes such concepts as creation, growth, change, and transformation.
When he deals with theoretical matters, Russell takes a dim view of impulse; but impulse takes on considerable importance when he directs his philosophical inquiry toward human behaviour -an importance comparable to that of elan vital in Bergson's philosophy. Russell is not willing to let impulse intrude where knowledge is concerned for fear that it might disturb the quietude of knowledge; but he recognizes the importance of impulse when he deals with practical concerns. In fact, he makes it the basis of human behaviour.
We cannot at this moment enter into a detailed discussion of the question of whether these such sharply divergent positions on theoretical matters and on practical matters constitute a logical contradiction; nor can we go into detail about the questions of whether, or how, his theoretical philosophy has influenced his practical philosophy. We can only summarize the main points of his social philosophy. The difference between Russell's theoretical philosophy and his social and practical philosophy is not merely a matter of differing content, but is reflected in vastly different styles of writing. His writing in theoretical philosophy, with its style drawn from mathematics, is very difficult to understand; but when he deals with practical philosophy, he employs a popular style which great numbers of readers find most attractive.
The three basic works in which Russell presents his social philosophy are Principles of Social Reconstruction, political Ideals, and (continued on p. 15) Roads to Freedom. All three of these books were written after the outbreak of the European War, and it can be said that all of them are, directly or indirectly, influenced by the war. When the war broke out, Russell was aghast, and viewed the war as a result of the combined evil powers of man -his power to destroy, his power to detract from the meaning of life, and his power to obstruct the development and creation of life. To combat such evil powers, Russell pleads for the rapid development of man's creative and progressive abilities. This advocacy is the central theme of his social philosophy.
A word must be added here: twenty-four years ago, in 1896, Russell published his German Social Democracy, at a time when interest ran high in the work of Karl Marx, and in the development of social democratic theory. Russell's book was chiefly factual and historical, but it affords evidence that even that long ago he was vitally interested in social problems.
When we compare the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy with what he has to say about social and practical problems, we note that the theoretical aspect is based on mathematics as a universal science, and that it depreciates individual psychology as being irrelevant; but when he deals with practical matters, psychology assumes a basic and important role. In fact, Russell holds that all institutions have originated to meet psychological needs, and, even further, that these'institutions cannot be adequately explained without reference to instincts. He not only erects his theories on psychological bases, but resorts to psychology as the criterion by which institutions are to be criticized, to determine which arouse higher impulses and which suppress the higher impulses and encourage the baser ones.
Russell sees human psychology as having three components: first, instinct; second, mind; and third, spirit. The parts of life which fall in the sphere of instinct include all natural impulses such as selfdefence, hunger, thirst, and sex; and when we extend the concept of reproduction, the family and the state. In short, instinct is the sphere in which is determined the success or failure of the individual career, and of the family and the state. It is the part of life which we inherit from the lower animals. The life of the mind is different from the life of instinct, in that the latter is personal, while the former is impersonal. Through the ,life of the mind, man disregards his own benefits or sufferings, and strives to attain universal knowledge.
Russell's concept of spirit somewhat resembles his concept of mind, in that both transcend the individual aspects of life. But he has the life of the mind transcending individual knowledge, while life of the spirit transcends individual feeling. The life which has feeling at its center finds fruition in the fine arts and in religion. The fine arts being in instinct and ascend to feeling, while religion, arising in feeling, gradually seeps down to permeate the life of instinct.
For Russell, the ideal development is one in which these three elements are in balance. Instinct infuses us with energy; knowledge provides us with method; and spirit directs us toward purpose. When energy, method, and purpose are coordinate, a man is at his best. But such a condition is rare in ordinary life; all too often we sacrifice two of the elements in our efforts to develop a third. When we sacrifice mind and spirit for excessive development of the life of instinct, we live the life of savages. When our effort to satisfy desire is not sufficiently informed by knowledge, we are barbarians, not civilized people. And when the life of the mind becomes too critical of the life of instinct, we become sceptics; we distrust the world; we lose the enthusiasm which only instinct can generate, become coldly critical and detached, and eventually withdraw from the world of action.
Russell tells us that man has developed the life of the mind'to such an extreme that the necessity has arisen for schools of philosophy which might come to the rescue and help him coordinate the parts that make up the whole. Among such schools of philosophy Russell includes James' Pragmatism and Bergson's Vitalism, both of which we have discussed in earlier lectures in this series. But Russell rejects both approaches, because he says that they are merely trying to adjust mind to instinct. He accuses them of having tried to make knowledge subordinate to instinct.
Russell holds that man should be characterized by universal feeling, so that he will not be confined and restricted by consideration of his own welfare, or the welfare of his family or his state. Instead, a man should be concerned with the welfare of all mankind, and direct all his efforts toward the promotion of this general welfare.
Russell lays upon social institutions the onus of individual man's inability to develop himself to the fullest. Such obstruction and suppression of individual development, however, is not of fundamental importance; not matter how great influence social institutions can wield, they cannot take away a man's internal freedom. Far more dreadful is social temptation and bribery. For example, an artist may have tremendous potential for artistic creation, but society subjects him to its control with money and the promise of fame, so that he dare not create according to his own vision, but succumbs, and ends up by pandering to the prevailing tastes of his society -and, in so doing, is less than' he might have been. The case is no different with the writer, or with the pol itician. Russell seems to distrust the pol itician most of all; in his opinion there is no politician who does not prostitute himself to the whims of his constituency, and who, even after he surrenders hi~integ-
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'rity, does not continue to subordinate his principles to the wishes of those whom he serves. Because these tactics of temptation and bribery, of buy men's souls, can and do stifle internal freedom beyond the possibility of resuscitation, they are more to be dreaded than forces which merely oppose or seek to suppress individual freedom.
But how, Russell asks, do such temptations and bribery, such purchase of man's soul, manage to obstruct the development of his individual freedom? Because social organization impairs the creative impulse and fosters the possessive impulse. Human activities fall into two categories, the creative and the possessive; and each is the manifestation of impulses which are creative or possessive. One cannot have such material goods as clothing, food, and other objects, and at the same time allow others to possess them. The impUlse to ownership of such goods is possessive. The scientist, on the other hand, when he discovers a new scientific law, or discerns a hitherto undiscovered relationship, has no concern with the way the discovery may affect him as an individual, but immediately shares his discovery through publication. His impulse is creative. But social organizations encourage man's possessive impUlse, and stifle his creative impulse.
This categorization of human impulses into the creative and the possessive is basic in Russell's social philosophy. In fact, we can say that his whole social philosophy is no more than the elaboration and application of this concept. He uses it as a criterion against which'to judge social institutions, and by means of which to determine which should be cultivated and which controlled. He takes exception both to state ownership of property and to private ownership. Both these institutions are indispensable to the operation of our society as it now exists, but Russell objects that both foster the possessive impulse. To put it simply, Russell takes the central ideas of socialism and anarchism, and combines them into one concept which forms the basis of his advocacies. He says, for example, that when the possession of property is accorded central importance, the state, in protecting private ownership, helps the rich to become richer, and suppresses the poor. Extending this principle from its internal affairs to its international relations, the state lends its power to the suppression of small states, and thus contributes to the growth of imperialism.
As we have already said, the European War convinced Russell that war is an evil, a manifestation of the power to destroy. For him, war demonstrates the bankruptcy of both institutions, state ownership of property and private ownership. Private ownership, with its inherent competition in both industry and commerce, has promoted colonialism and fostered the development of imperialism. Further, the state as an institution, by protecting private ownership, vitiates individual free-dom and rea son, and subj ect s t he ind ividual to t he cont r ol of and suppre ssi on by national power . As far as Russel l i s concerned, t he European Wa r was an irref utab le demonst r ati on of the def icienci es inher ent in ' bot h st at e and pr i vate owner ship of property . As ide from thes e t wo insti tuti ons, Rus sel l says that the i nst i t uti ons of education, t he family, th e re li gion shoul d have fost er ed the devel opment of cr eat i ve impul ses , but t hat, in cold fa ct, t hey have fail ed to do so. It i s not so muc h that such i nst itutions are not by natu r e capabl e of fo ster ing creat i ve impul ses as it i s that th ey have become contaminate d wi th possessive impulses, and have come so completely under t heir sway th at they have fall en into decadence. Ed ucati on should be a process' of advent ure and inventi on. It should be cr eat i ve. But, instead, it has become an agent for possess iveness. Infil t ration of th e educat ive pr ocess by t he in stitution of property has imposed shackles whic h prevent the f r ee develo pment of educat i on. Thus educat ion has degenerated into pr eservat i on of th e st at us quo . The ai m of t he school as i t now exists has become t hat of mak i ng t he indi vidual obedient and compl ai sant , of r enderi ng him unquesti oningly subje ct t o t he cont rol s and regula t i ons whic h surround him . Educati on i s no longer concer ned, as i t ought to be, wi th the f ree devel opment of creative impulses.
Rus sel l charges that exist ing educational institut ions aim not at t he cul t iva ti on of tho ught , but r ather at t he cul t ivati on of beli ef . Why should th is be? Becau se education , as an institution, has been subordi nat ed to t he institution of propert y, and the educator is afra id th at independent t hought mi ght create di sturbances whic h woul d threat en proper ty ri ght s . Cre at i ve education should be a matter of adventur e; bu t Ru ssel l claims t hat man f ears thought more than anything el se in the world, even mor e th an he f ears death and destructi on. Thought i s persi ste nt ; it i s re formi ng; i t i s destr uctive; cr i t ica l thought ignore s privile ge , power , exis t i ng inst itu ti ons and comfortable habits ; it i s anarchic; it re cogni zes no aut hor ity and f ears no l aw; it is great ; it is quick; i t i s f r ee , it enl ig ht ens th e world ; it i s t he ultimate honor of man. Creat ive educat i on should not limit i t self to th e prese rvation of t he pas t ; it shoul d aim at th e creat ion of a bet t er futu re .
Rus se l l br i ngs hi s fundament al concept of creat i ve and possess i ve imp ul ses t o bear not only on exis ti ng instituti ons, but on progr ammes of soci al r econstruct ion as wel l . He has commente d cr iti cally on al l such programmes that he has been able to find, and fi nds fatal f la ws i n al l of t hem. Hi s cr i t i ci sm of soci al i sm is th at i t i s primar i ly a phil osophy of economic s. He sets forth f our cr iter ia by which we shoul d measur e any industri al inst itu t i on: f i rst , does i t provi de a maximum of product ion? second, does i t foster a fa ir system of distr ibut i on? thi rd , does it 18 accor d wor kers reasona bl e trea tment? and fourt h (the mos t im por ta nt ) , does it accel er at e materi al and spiritua l development, and bri ng about progre ss and enr ichmen t? If an industria l insti tu t i on sat isf i es only t he f irst cr iter i on, th en we hav e over-product i on and our econom y goes out of kilter. Socia lism sat i sf ies t hi s cr iter ion, and t he second and t hi rd as wel l , but i t has not yet progres sed t o t he poi nt of sat i sfyi ng the four t h.
For anot her t hing, when socia l ism is put into practice , the state as an inst ituti on must be strengt hened. Russell derogat es t he in st itut ion of t he state, blaming it for suppr ess i ng th e i ndiv idual and impeding his free devel opment.
We have already ta lked abou t t he negat ive aspects of Russ el l's phi l osophy i n general . The construc t ive el ement s of hi s phi lo sophy are not so much ideas which he has develo ped independentl y as t hey are combi nation s of ideas drawn from var ious schools of soci al i sm. For exam pl e , he favours pUbl ic owners hi p of t he l and, of min i ng, and of t ransportatio n faci l i t ies, and st rongly supports cooperat i ves bot h for producer s and consumer s . He has written i n suppo r t of the gui ld system in indust ry and commer ce, and in advocacy of f ul l aut onomy for profe ssional groups . For Russel l t he st at e i s no m ore th an a judge which saf eguar ds the r i ghts of th e people; and he says that t here should be a f ederal gov er nment above t he sta te to restrai n i t from usi ng i t s power in ways~o n t ra ry t o t he genera l good .
These th r ee contempor ary phi loso phers , James , Be rgson, and Ru ssell re present t he spi r it bf our ti me , both i n t hei r books and i n t he i nf luence they have had on publi c opi nion. Ru ssel l appear s t o differ from t he ot her two , but when we examine matters clo sely we fi nd t hat the diff erence is quite super fic i al. W e fin d th at Russel l 's philo sophy abo ut t he sta t e and about society is not essent ial ly di ff erent f rom that of James and Berg son. Russe l l j oi ns forces wit h t hem in th e importance he attaches to cre ati on, growth , change, and transformat ion. Ev en t hough Russell crit ic i zes James fo r subordinati ng the l i f e of inst inct t o t he af fair s of pract ica l liv ing, he himself incor por at es universal fee l ing into knowl edge. But James i s more sophis t ic ate d than Russe l l, for while Russell t akes mankind as a whol e as t he subjec t of hi s observati ons , James gi ves his at te nt i on t o t he individua l person. James has consi sten t ly r ef used to concer n himself with t he concept of mankind in t he abst rac t, and has devoted himse l f enti re ly to the life of t he individ ual as an indi vidua1.
To conclude , each of th ese t hree philosop her s has ma de hi s own cont r i bution. James devel ops t he concept of a dependable f uture wh ich i s active and f l exi bl e , and whi ch can be f r eely crea t ed by t hose who l ive in it ; his radical li ber al i sm is a philosophy wh ic h invites each man to cre ate hi s own fu ture wo r ld. Th i s i s James' cont r i but i on. Bergson' s emphasis on intui ti on adds an ele ment of f res hn ess to this creation of one' s own fu ture , es peci al ly when he insi sts that it is not a ma tter of ra tionali zi ng or calc ul ati ng, but comes as a re sult of our i nnate imp ul se t o forwa rd str iv i ng. This i s Ber gson's contribution. Russell develo ps the idea of br oad and univers al knowledge which i s not subje~t to th e limitati ons of th e t hi nki ng of individuals; and tells us how such knowledge can suppl ement i nt ui t i on, so that man can give direction to hi s f orward s t r i vi ng. This i s Russel l 's contribution.
